Cell-based privacy-friendly roadpricing by Garcia, F. D. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a preprint version which may differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/111299
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Cell-based Privacy-friendly Roadpricing
Flavio D. Garciaa, Eric R. Verheula,b, Bart Jacobsa
aInstitute for Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University Nijmegen.
P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
bKey Controls, Wagnerlaan 33, NL-1411 JD Naarden, The Netherlands.
Abstract
This paper proposes a new approach to electronic roadpricing, based on a
division of the roadpricing area into cells, each with their own fee. Some of the
cells are secretly marked as check cells. On board equipment in each vehicle
contains a secure element that is made aware of these check cells and helps the
pricing authorities to monitor the vehicle’s whereabouts in a privacy-friendly
manner. This approach is not only original but it also improves upon earlier
approaches since it solves issues regarding positioning accuracy, collusion
between diﬀerent users, and the required level of interaction. Moreover, with
slight modiﬁcation this cell-based roadpricing can also be used for automatic
handling of parking charges.
1. Introduction
Roadpricing, also known as Electronic Traﬃc Pricing (ETP), refers to a
location-based charge for road use. It exists in several forms, for instance
via charges for entering the city center (London) or for particular motorways
(France or Italy), or for lorries (Germany). Here we consider satellite-based
systems, using GPS or Galileo, for personal vehicles. Such approaches have
been elaborated to some extent in the Netherlands, as part of earlier, now
abandoned, government plans. However, at the European level this form of
roadpricing is still on the political agenda (based on the framework [2, 3]).
The main reasons for replacing a ﬂat road tax by a location-based approach
are: (1) fairness of charges, since one only pays for actual road use, and
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(2) the possibility to steer the traﬃc supply via a ﬂexible pricing policy
(e.g. making busy roads expensive during rush hours).
Location-based roadpricing for personal vehicles is a highly privacy sensitive
matter since it requires detailed location information of individual vehicles.
Public support depends on proper privacy protection via an architecture
guaranteeing data minimalization focused on the goal of roadpricing itself,
and not on secondary goals (like speed limit enforcement). The topic has
been picked up in the computer security research community, see [5, 8, 11, 7],
and several diﬀerent protocols have been proposed. This paper, which is an
extended version of [9], contributes with a novel protocol, which we call cell-
based roadpricing (CBR). It uses cells (covering the roadpricing area) both for
fee calculation and for fraud detection (via a secure element, like a smart card,
embedded in the car’s toll device). Our approach addresses some problems
with fraud detection in earlier protocols, like time-dependence, collusion,
GPS-precision and required level of interaction. The paper does not introduce
any new cryptographic primitives and makes use of existing techniques. Its
value lies in adapting these techniques in an original manner to a context of
considerable societal relevance. Our CBR approach allows certain additional
functionality, such as automatic parking-fee collection and a limited form of
pay-as-you-drive insurance, see Section 7.
By 2015 all (new) cars in the European Union will be equipped with the
eCall system that automatically contacts Europes single emergency number
112 in the event of a serious road accident, e.g. a collision or when car oc-
cupant pushes an emergency button. The eCall system then communicates
the vehicles location to the emergency services. The eCall system in a car
consists of a small onboard unit equipped with GPS and means of commu-
nication. We believe that the hardware required for CBR could beneﬁt from
the existing eCall hardware as they are similar1. By sharing hardware, im-
plementation of CBR could be more cost eﬀective. However, this would need
further investigation.
2. Preliminaries
We adopt the main building blocks of the Electronic Toll Pricing (ETP) ar-
chitecture proposed by the European Union [2]. It distinguishes the following
ﬁve components/parties of the system:
1http://fevr.org/new/2011/09/will-e-call-now-soon-be-introduced
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• an ETP subscriber;
• a toll charger TC;
• a toll service provider TSP;
• an on board unit OBU, in every (personal) vehicle;
• a secure element SE incorporated in the OBU.
An ETP subscriber is the party that uses the road of the toll charger and
for this subscribes to a toll service provider. The main information security
objectives of the subscriber are twofold. The ﬁrst objective is that the ETP
subscriber gets to pay the correct amount for road usage and that he can
validate that. We will call this property financial integrity from the perspect-
ive of the subscriber. The second objective is that the subscriber’s privacy
can adequately protected in the scheme. This obviously includes more than
protection of the subscriber’s road movements but we concentrate on this
aspect in this paper. With adequate protection we mean that the subscriber
accepts the privacy protection design of the toll service provider system and
has assurance that the actual implementation adheres to the design (‘public
trust’).
Preferably, the privacy protection the scheme provides should be paramet-
erizable and the subscriber should be able to validate the privacy protection
himself without having to rely on a (trusted) third party. The toll charger
TC is the party that collects a toll fee for the usage of the roads and deﬁnes
the prices and conditions of use. Typically national or regional authorities
are TCs, but also commercial parties ‘owning’ the roads, can be a TC.
The toll service provider TSP is the party that provides the ETP service.
It periodically determines the fee to be paid by each subscriber (vehicle) for
his road usage. In this paper the distinction between TC and TSP is not
always clearly made, since it is not so relevant for the protocol. An important
information security objective shared by the TC and TSP is that subscribers
are correctly charged for the road usage and can detect fraud. A speciﬁc
security objective of the TC is that it should be able to validate that usage
of its roads is correctly reﬂected in the payments of the TSP. We will call
this financial integrity, from the perspective of either the TC or the TSP.
The on board unit OBU is a satellite (GPS or Galileo) enabled device that will
be attached to every vehicle subscribed to the ETP service. We assume that
3
this device stores a pricing function P that takes as input a location l and a
time t and it outputs a price p = P(l, t) which corresponds to the toll price of
the corresponding road at time t. Furthermore, the OBU must have a timing
device which is reasonably in sync with the local time. It should also be able
to occasionally communicate with the TSP in order to report usage and to
update the pricing function (and a list of checkpoints that corresponds with
the location of surveillance cameras, see below). Although the OBU should
be reliable it is untrusted, from a systems perspective: subscribers may try
to manipulate it, for instance via the power supply or via the satellite signals
(shielding the device or feeding it false signals), in order to reduce the fee
they need to pay.
The secure element SE is a tamper resistant device, like a smartcard, which
has a modest amount of non-volatile memory and processing power. This pro-
cessing power must be enough to perform basic (public key) cryptographic
operations. Typically, the secure element does not have its own power or
clock. It is comparable to a SIM card in a mobile phone albeit with more
cryptographic capabilities. The private key in the SE determines the cryp-
tographic identity of the SE, and thus of the OBU in which it is embedded.
2.1. Thin and fat OBU’s
Before going into the technicalities, we brieﬂy describe the setting and the
main idea underlying the protocol that is proposed in this paper.
In all satellite-based roadpricing systems vehicles have an on board unit OBU
that can at least determine the location of the vehicle and communicate with
the back-oﬃce. In [8] a distinction is made between thin and fat OBU’s.
A thin OBU just collects location information and passes it on the back-
oﬃce where the appropriate fee is calculated. This is a simple but extremely
privacy-unfriendly approach, since the sensitive location information is stored
outside the direct control of the individual involved, in a large database that
is vulnerable in various ways. A fat OBU on the other hand is capable of
calculating the price itself, via a pricing function that is executed in a secure
environment. At the end of a reporting period the OBU sends the cumulative
fee to the TSP.
The fat approach is privacy friendly but has two big disadvantages:
1. a fat OBU is more complex than a thin one, and thus more expensive
and more vulnerable;
2. fraud detection is more complex with fat OBU’s in comparison with
thin ones.
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One way to handle the ﬁrst point is to reduce the trusted computing base
(TCB) of an OBU to a minimum and to place this TCB on a tamper-resistant
secure element SE such as a smart card. This separation makes it easier
to add additional (commercial) services to the OBU, or alternatively, to
add roadpricing functionality to existing in-car equipment (such as satellite
navigation) by adding the secure element2.
The second point is a serious issue. First, fraud detection with thin OBU’s is
easy: a TC/TSP just places roadside cameras at random places and checks
if the vehicles that pass by report the location where they are spotted. If
not, the car owners will be ﬁned. One sensitive point in this approach is
that camera locations must remain secret, throughout the reporting period.
If they become known, drivers may simply switch oﬀ their OBU and take a
diﬀerent route, avoiding cameras. With a fat OBU one way of fraud detec-
tion is to have the TC/TSP communicate brieﬂy from a roadside detection
point with the (secure element in the) OBU of each passing car in order to
check if the last few locations used by the pricing function are consistent
with the check locations. We remark that the ETP architecture [2] actu-
ally suggests the usage of 5.8 GHz Dedicated Short-Range Communications
(DSRC) for this. However, since such checks are active, involving two-way
communication, they will be noticed very quickly by passing cars. The check
locations will thus become publicly known, negatively aﬀecting the eﬃcacy
of the checks.
Another fraud detection approach is to let the OBU (or its secure element)
commit itself to each step of the fee calculation, for instance via a simple hash
function [8] or via a more complex non-interactive commitment scheme [5]
(using homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge proofs to exclude negat-
ive sub-fees). After receiving a (cumulative) fee report, the TC/TSP may ask
the OBU to “open” certain commitments, corresponding to roadside camera
locations, in order to check details of the cumulative report. Auditing thus
involves interaction with the user, even in the case where everything turns
out to be ﬁne. In contrast, with the approach proposed here there will only
be interaction with the user in case fraud is detected.
A crucial problem with the commitment approach is its vulnerability to col-
lusion, exploiting time dependence. During such commitment checks the
2The secure element is bound to a particular individual, and can via this separation be
transferred from one vehicle to another.
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locations of the road-side cameras become known. If checks are performed
immediately, like in [5], people may collude, where one of them (who drives
a lot) reports ﬁrst and learns about the check locations and the other ones
subsequently delete commitments for non-check locations in their fee reports
(thus reducing their fee).
Hence such checks can only be performed well after the reporting period,
when all OBU’s have sent in their fee report. But such timing dependency
may introduce other vulnerabilities. What should happen if you are on hol-
iday at the end of the reporting period, outside the roadpricing area, and
outside reach of the TSP? If you are allowed to send in your report with a
delay, when you return, you could adapt your fee report based on knowledge
of the checkpoints. Such manipulations can exploit the fact that secure ele-
ments do not have their own (secure) clock and so you can feed them false
timing information. One way of addressing this “absence” problem is forcing
OBU’s to report their fee as soon as they leave the roadpricing area. This
naturally leads to the idea of carving up the area into cells (where border
cells play a special role). Another problem with the commitment approach
is that it requires communication with the OBU after fee reporting allowing
fraudsters to claim their OBU is broken or stolen.
We ﬁnally note the scheme described in [13]. It has a thin OBU in the sense
that it is based on a vehicle transponder that constantly sends time-location
tuples to the TSP. However these tuples are not associated with vehicles
but with commitments to random tags constructed by the subscribers in a
registration phase and transferred to their vehicle transponder. During the
reconciliation phase the fee is calculated based on secure multiparty com-
putation involving the TSP and the subscriber through a web application.
Enforcement is also based on spot checks; in a zero knowledge fashion the
subscriber needs to prove he generated a time-location consistent with the
spot check. This scheme not only requires substantial subscriber interaction
but also allows the subscriber to claim his tag information is lost.
2.2. Current protocol idea
We now assume that the roadpricing area (country, region, or continent)
is covered by square, non-overlapping cells of a relatively small size (e.g.
a square kilometer). When you enter a cell you will have to pay a certain
amount, depending on the cell (and possibly the time of day). These payment
details are incorporated in a payment function P that will be left unspeciﬁed.
If you stay longer in the same cell, you may have to pay again, see the
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discussion in Section 3.2. But more importantly, there will be a new charge
as soon as you enter the next cell. In Section 2.3 we elaborate a bit more on
the organization of these cells.
A certain subset of cells are marked as “check cells” or “checkpoints” and
contain (hidden) roadside cameras connected with Automated Number Plate
Recognition (ANPR) equipment. These markings are chosen by the TSP and
the TC and change every billing period (of, say, one or three months). The
secrecy of these markings is crucial for the protocol. Another crucial aspect is
that the secure element in the OBU gets to know these checkpoint markings,
via a secure connection with the TSP, but the subscriber or its (untrusted)
OBU should not learn any information about the current checkpoints. This
conﬁdential transfer of checkpoints happens before the beginning of each new
billing period. The checkpoint list may be generated in secure hardware and
be transmitted via secure channels to the SEs without becoming available in
the clear.
Upon entering a new cell, the OBU reports — or ‘declares’, as we shall say
below — this transition to its SE. The SE replies with a “ticket”. The ticket
is a (randomised) encryption of ﬁxed data, e.g. ‘OK’ or ‘0’ with some padding
if the new cell is not a checkpoint. But if the cell is a checkpoint — which is
known to the SE but not to the OBU— the ticket will be meaningful for fraud
detection later on. The encryptions should be such that one cannot determine
which tickets are for checkpoint cells and which are for non-checkpoint cells.
In this way the trusted element works against its owner, in the interest of
the TC and TSP: it secretly monitors the user. Thus, the SE is the TC and
TSP’s ambassador (or spy, if you like), see also [6].
Driving around without a proper, up-to-date list of check cells is dangerous,
because without it your SE cannot produce appropriate tickets when you
happen to enter a check cell (leading to subsequent ﬁnes, when audited).
Hence it is in the own interest of users to have their system up-to-date.
Whenever the SE does not have — for whatever reasons — an up-to-date
list of check cells, it should report so via an alarm signal to the user. There
should be procedures in place for malfunction, for instance by pushing a
‘reset’ button (including an implicit notiﬁcation to the TSP) or by going
quickly to some service station. Alternatively, one could consider to let the
SE resort to treat all cells as check cells when it is not equipped with a
proper, up-to-date list of check cells. This implies that the scheme provides
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Figure 1: An expensive cell exclusively covering a motorway segment, in between two
exits, surrounded by inexpensive cells.
no privacy when subscribers do not properly update their OBU3.
From a system perspective the secure element is trusted and inaccessible
to malicious users. In contrast, the OBU is untrusted. When the trusted
element ever gets compromised, the system breaks down. This is usually
the case with a TCB: if a SIM gets compromised identities can be stolen
and phone bills will probably end up with the wrong person. But having this
tamper resistant SE as TCB also simpliﬁes matters a lot: the SE is trusted so
it can simply accumulate the fees per cell, store the result in its non-volatile
memory, and report the cumulative fee, appropriately authenticated, to the
TSP at the end of the reporting period. Because we have such a clearly
separated TCB we do not need to use the homomorphic encryptions and
zero knowledge proofs as in [5].
Both the TC and TSP trust the accumulation of fees reported by the SE, but
they do not trust that the SE has been notiﬁed appropriately by the OBU
at every cell transition. The TC and TSP thus check these notiﬁcations via
the tickets. As part of the fee reporting — or possibly only on request of
the TSP— the OBU sends all tickets of the reporting period to the TSP.
The TSP can then open the tickets for the checkpoint cells where the vehicle
has been spotted and see if the content is appropriate. The TSP can also
communicate this evidence to the TC. Details are given below, in Section 3.
2.3. Cells and roads
One thing that is new in our approach is the reliance on cells, and not on
road segments or distance, as basis for payment. It deserves some more
explanation. One basic idea in roadpricing is that certain roads (e.g. busy
3Jeroen Prins is thanked for this suggestion.
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motorways) or bridges/tunnels are more expensive than for instance quiet
country roads. Simply making all cells in which an expensive motorway oc-
curs expensive is too crude, since there may be multiple roads in a particular
cell. What we propose is that the price of a cell with multiple roads corres-
ponds to the price of the cheapest road (in that cell). In order to charge the
appropriate fee for an expensive road one cell is made very expensive that
only contains this road and cannot be avoided. Such a cell can for instance
be found on a stretch of motorway in between two exits, as illustrated in
Figure 1. Of course, such a cell is a prime candidate to be (regularly) a
check cell. One (more) advantage of using cells over road segments is that
substantial margins can be allowed in the accuracy of the location provided
by the positioning system, see Figure 2. This is a great beneﬁt, since in
practice the positioning accuracy is inﬂuenced for instance by atmospheric
disturbances or by reﬂections of satellite signals in urban areas. Such lack of
accuracy may be a problem for a road-segment based approach, when there
are adjacent, parallel roads with diﬀerent prices. In contrast, our cell-based
approach is more robust. Also, the system is independent of the (often pro-
prietary) mechanisms for transforming satellite signals into road segments,
on which other roadpricing approaches rely. Hence it can be realized more
easily via open (international) standards. Section 6 discusses some issues
related to the (ideal) size of cells.
error margin
actual cell
Figure 2: Positioning system error margin around cells.
2.4. Timing
As we argued above, the timing of fee reporting, auditing, and feedback is a
sensitive matter in road pricing. In our approach, fee reporting takes place:
1. at the end of the reporting period;
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2. when a vehicle leaves the road pricing area (e.g. the country);
3. when a vehicle is sold or taken out of service.
The last point is rather special. It can be handled by giving an OBU a special
‘report now’ button; after pushing it the embedded SE should be removed.
The passage of a border will be detected by the OBU and should lead to
an (automatic) fee report. It may create some administrative overhead for
people who frequently cross borders, but since fee reporting is automatic this
should not be such a problem.
It is a more serious problem if the fee report is suppressed by a malicious
user upon leaving the road pricing area. In this way a vehicle may disappear
from the grid. However, upon re-entering there are two options.
• This re-entering happens ‘soon’, still within the same reporting period
as the departure; then the vehicle can in principle continue to drive
around in the roadpricing area, using the (still valid) list of check cells
in its SE. The OBU/SE will have to report normally, at the end of this
period.
• Re-entering happens ‘late’, in a subsequent reporting period. There is
now a window for fraud, because the check locations from the reporting
period of departure must be assumed to be publicly known. However,
the vehicle will need an (updated) list of check cells before it can drive
around after re-entering without any risk. It is at this point that it has
to communicate with the TSP, to request the new list, and the TSP
notices the missing report (from the period of departure); the TSP will
impose a (hefty) penalty for not reporting upon leaving the territory.
The ﬁrst, ordinary way of reporting happens at the end of the reporting
period, say once a month. Vehicles will be forced to report, because only
after reporting they will receive the new list of check cells. Since there is
some time in between entering one cell and entering the next one, the fee
reporting need not interfere with the ordinary declaring.
After (some time after) receiving the fee reports and distributing the new
lists of check cells, the TSP goes into the auditing phase: tickets for check
cells will be decrypted and inspected, possibly leading to penalties. Notice
that this auditing does not require any interaction with the user — assuming
appropriate tickets for check cells are submitted.
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(There is one practical issue related to performance. If all vehicles submit
their fee report at 24:00 hours of the last day of the month, communica-
tion channels will be overloaded. Hence one may wish to allocate diﬀerent
reporting times to diﬀerent vehicles, in order to balance the load. This in-
volves some additional administration, including management of check cells
lists and delay of auditing, but it does not change the system fundament-
ally. More pragmatically one may reserve for monthly fee submission several
hours during the night, say between 23:00 and 6:00, and make driving free
of charge during that short period.)
3. The protocol
This section describes our new, privacy-friendly ETP protocol. This protocol
is a triple < S,U ,D > of polynomial-time interactive protocols. The Setup
Protocol S is a two party protocol involving the TSP and the SE. This pro-
tocol is run when a new SE is added to the system. The Update protocol U
is a three party protocol involving the SE, the TSP and the OBU. This pro-
tocol runs periodically, at the end/begining of a billing period, e.g. monthly.
The protocol Declare Segment D is a two party protocol involving the SE
and the OBU. This protocol runs every time that the vehicle enters a new
cell — and also when the current cell ticket expires in case of parking, see
Section 7. Furthermore, we assume that the OBU is provided with a clock
which keeps track of local time with reasonable accuracy.
Notation. We write {m }pk to denote the encryption of message m with
public key pk, while [m ]sk denotes message m followed by a signature on m
with private key sk.
3.1. System Setup S
When the system is initialized,
• the TSP creates a public key pair (pkTSP, skTSP) and together with the
TC partitions the map of the country (or region under consideration)
in small cells, forming a grid that overlaps the relevant area. Let C be
a mapping from GPS coordinates (lat, long) to a cell number c. These
cells must be small enough to provide the desired granularity level for
road pricing. The function P assigns to each cell c and time t the
corresponding road price p.
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• the OBU stores a ticket list T which is initialized to the empty list.
• the SE of a vehicle generates its own public key pair (pk, sk). The
public key is registered by the TSP and the public key pkTSP of the
TSP is stored in the SE and in the OBU. The SE has a counter balance
which is initialized to zero. It also has a register time which represents
the SE’s local notion of time and can only be increased. This register
is updated during a successful Update or Declare protocol execution.
3.2. Update U
The purpose of the update protocol is threefold:
• for the TSP to get the toll charge for the last billing period;
• for the SE to get the updated checkpoint list for the next billing period;
• to perform fraud detection.
At the beginning of each billing period, the TC creates a (secret) list check-
points of checkpoint cells. The checkpoint cells are those cells where the TC
will have a surveillance camera for the next billing period. These checkpoint
cells will be used later on for fraud detection. To prevent abuse from the
TC/TSP, the maximum size of the checkpoints list Nchk must be enforced
by the SE to be a small fraction of the total number of cells in the map Ncells.
This prevent TC or TSP to set too many cells in the system as checkpoints
thus hampering privacy. At the end of of each billing period, the TSP, OBU
and SE execute the protocol depicted in Figure 3.
The OBU initiates the update protocol by sending a timestamp ts to the
SE. The SE checks that the timestamp is in the future with respect to time
and if so, updates time accordingly. In message (2), the SE sends back
the current balance balance together with the timestamp ts signed with its
private key skSE. Next, in step (3), the OBU sends this last message together
with the ticket list T , encrypted, to the TSP. In step (4) the TSP sends the
checkpoint list for the next billing period checkpointsnew signed together
with a timestamp ts. This message is encrypted with the public key pkSE of
the SE. In step (5), the OBU simply forwards this message to the SE. The
SE validates that the timestamp ts is in the future with respect of its notion
of time i.e., ts > time and sets time = ts and updates its checkpoint list.
When the TSP performs fraud detection, it is assumed that the TC provided
TSP with evidence that the vehicle v has been at cell c at time t. Then
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(skTSP, pkSE)
TSP
(T , pkTSP)
OBU
(skSE, pkTSP, time, balance, ckpt)
SE
1. update, ts
ts > time
time := ts
2. [ balance, ts ]skSE
3. update v, { [ balance, ts ]skSE, T }pkTSP
4. { [ckptnew, ts ]skTSP }pkSE
5. { [ckptnew, ts ]skTSP }pkSE
ckpt := ckptnew
Figure 3: Update Protocol4.
the TSP will decrypt each entry in the transcript list T provided by v (see
Section 8 for optimizations), ignoring those entries that decrypt to zero.
Entries for (visited) check cells must be of the form < cpre, ccur, ts, p > with
c = ccur and ts ≈ t. If that is not the case it means that this vehicle has
committed fraud.
The signature over the new checkpoint list on steps (4) and (5) is there to
prevent an adversary from being able to send a corrupt (potentially empty)
checkpoint list to the SE which would result in ﬁnes, or other kind of damage,
for the aﬀected vehicles. Note that these signatures are not required for the
security of the protocol as deﬁned in Section 4.
To be precise, instead of ts ≈ t we should write t−δ ≤ ts ≤ t+δ where δ is a
system parameter determining the validity period of a ticket. This constant δ
should be chosen carefully, proportional to the cell size. The value of δ must
correspond to the maximum time that a vehicle can take to travel through
a cell. If δ is chosen too small then slow vehicles will have to pay multiple
times for the same cell. Instead, when δ is too large, it allows a vehicle to
4typeset using the MSC package [12].
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commit fraud by traveling on a speciﬁc route several times while declaring it
only once. As rough indication, one can take δ to be 30 minutes, for 100×100
meter cells, so that a traﬃc jam does not immediately lead to multiple tickets
for the same cell.
3.3. Declare Segment D
Every time that the vehicle enters a new cell ccur the OBU and the SE run
the protocol depicted in Figure 4. The situation for parking is slightly dif-
ferent, see Section 7. In Figure 4 cpre is the previous cell, ccur = C(lat, long)
(T , pkTSP)
OBU
(skSE, pkTSP, time, balance, ckpt)
SE
1. cpre, ccur, ts, p
ts > time
p > 0
time := ts
balance+= p
if ccur ∈ ckpt
ticket := { [cpre, ccur, ts, p]SE }pkTSP
else
ticket := { 0 }pkTSP
2. ticket
Figure 4: Declare Segment Protocol.
is the current cell, ts is the local time and p = P(ccur, ts) is the toll price.
Upon receipt of message (1), the secure element veriﬁes that the cell cpre
correspond to the ccur of the previous Declare Segment protocol run. The
SE validates that the timestamp ts is in the future with respect of its no-
tion of time i.e., ts > time and checks that p > 0. Then the SE adapts its
local time, by setting time = ts, and increases the counter balance by p, and
subsequently it returns a ticket (using randomised encryption). If the cell
ccur ∈ checkpoints then the SE sets ticket := { [cpre, ccur, ts, p]SE }pkTSP .
Otherwise it sets ticket := { 0 }pkTSP . The OBU stores the ticket from mes-
sage (2) in the ticket list T , until the next update protocol execution.
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We remark that the subscriber’s OBU can, independently of the SE, store
all declarations in plaintext and keep its own balance register allowing the
subscriber to validate the charges sent to the TSP during the update protocol.
We also remark that one can easily let the cell numbers support a notion of
adjacency allowing the SE to determine that the previous and current cell
are indeed adjacent allowing an additional form of fraud detection.
4. Security notions
This section introduces diﬀerent security notions. Most of it is standard and
it is taken from the literature. It ﬁrst recalls the notion of indistinguishability
under chosen ciphertext attacks for an encryption scheme and the notion of
strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks for a signature
scheme. Then we propose a new security deﬁnition for ETP protocols that
capture realistic threats that have not been considered in previous security
deﬁnitions from the literature.
Definition 4.1. An encryption scheme is a triple Γ = (K, E ,D) of prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithms. K takes as input the security para-
meter 1η and produces a key pair (pk, sk) where pk is the public encryption
key and sk is the private decryption key. E takes as input a public key pk
and a plaintext m and outputs a ciphertext. D takes as input a private
key sk and a ciphertext and outputs a plaintext or ⊥. It is required that
P[(pk, sk) ← K(1η); c ← E(pk, m);m′ ← D(sk, c) : m = m′] = 1. We write
{m }pk to denote E(pk, m).
Definition 4.2 (IND-CCA-Game).
IND-CCA-GameΓ,A(η) :
(sk, pk) ← K(1η)
p0, p1 ← AD0 (pk)
b ← {0, 1}
b′ ← AD1 ({ pb }pk)
winif if b = b′.
Adversaries implicitly pass state i.e., from A0 to A1.
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Definition 4.3 (IND-CCA). An encryption scheme Γ is said to be IND-CCA
secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A = (A0,A1)
P[IND-CCA-GameΓ,A(η)]− 1/2
is a negligible function of η. This adversary has access to a decryption oracle
D that on input a bitstring c′ outputs D(sk, c) with the only restriction that
c is not equal to the challenge ciphertext { pb }pk.
We recall the deﬁnition of signature scheme and the notion of strong exist-
ential unforgeability under chosen message attacks.
Definition 4.4. A signature scheme is a triple (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) of probabil-
istic polynomial-time algorithms. Gen takes as input the security parameter
1η and produces a key pair (vk, sk) where vk is the signature verification key
and sk is the secret signing key. Sign takes as input sk and a message m
and produces a signature s of m. Vrfy takes as input vk, a message m and a
signature s and outputs whether or not s is a valid signature of m.
SEUΣ(A) :
(vk, sk) ← Gen(1η)
m,σ ← ASsk(vk)
winif Vrfy(vk, (m,σ))
We recall the standard notion of strong existential unforgeability under chosen
message attacks [10].
Definition 4.5 (Strong existential unforgeability). A signature scheme Σ =
(Gen, Sign,Vrfy) is a strong, existential unforgeable if the success probability
of any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the game SEUΣ,A(η) is
negligible in the security parameter η.
Next we introduce a new security notion for ETP protocols. Here an ad-
versary is able to navigate a number of vehicles at will and it is also able
to communicate with a number of secure elements and with the TSP. The
adversary wins the game if it is able to get a toll fee reduction for any vehicle
and manages to do so with low probability of being detected. Low probab-
ility here means lower probability than that of simply driving by through a
random cell without declaring it. Such an adversary models, for instance,
the situation where a number of users collude in order to avoid toll charges.
This threat has not been considered by Balasch et al [5].
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Definition 4.6 (Security-Game).
Security-GameΠ,A(η) :
params ← Setup(1η)
v ← AO,D(params)
(l, t) ← Trajectory(v)
p, b ← Result(v)
winif if b = 1 and p < P( (l, t))
were the adversary A has access to an oracle D which on input a vehicle iden-
tifier v and a GPS coordinate g, models the (physical) movement of vehicle
v from the current location to GPS coordinates g. If g corresponds to a cell
c ∈ checkpoints then the oracle provides the corresponding evidence to the
TSP. A has also access to an oracle O which allows her to communicate
to the other parties (in this case the SE and the TSP) in the ETP protocol
Π. The function Trajectory, on input a vehicle identifier v returns a vector
of pairs Location × Time, corresponding to the trajectory of vehicle v that
has been submitted to the oracle D during the previous billing period. The
function Result, on input a vehicle identifier v returns the toll charge p which
v has to pay as a result of the last Update protocol run, together with a bit b
which equals one when no fraud has been detected for vehicle v. The function
P is overloaded in the definition to vectors of Location × Time pairs and
computes the correct price of this trajectory.
Definition 4.7 (Security). An ETP protocol Π =< S,U ,D > is said to be
secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A
P[Security-GameΠ,A(η)] < Nchk/Ncells + negl(η)
where negl is a negligible function on its input η.
5. Security and privacy of the protocol
Theorem 5.1 (Security). If the encryption scheme Γ is IND-CCA secure
and the signature scheme Σ is strong, existential unforgeable then the protocol
proposed in Section 3 is secure with respect to Definition 4.7.
17
Proof. Assume by the contrary that there is an adversary A that wins the
Security-Game with probability signiﬁcantly larger than Nchk/Ncells. In
order for A to be able to win the Security-Game, it must be able to drive a
vehicle through a cell without declaring it or do so but with a lower price. In
order to win with probability signiﬁcantly higher than Nchk/Ncells, it must
either be able to construct valid tickets for the checkpoint cells or be able to
avoid checkpoint cells with non-negligible advantage. In the ﬁrst case case
we build the following adversary B against the IND-CCA security of the
encryption scheme. In the second we build the following adversary C against
the strong unforgeability of the signature scheme.
The adversary B will ﬁrst simulate the environment for A, this is, it will
proceed as in System Setup, creating all public key pairs by itself, except for
pkSE of a randomly chosen vehicle v. For this key B will use the challenge key
from the IND-CCA game to A. Then, B creates a checkpoint list containing
one single cell c and sets the challenge plaintext p0 = {c} and sets p1 equal
to the empty checkpoint list. B receives then a challenge ciphertext { pb }pkSE
which it uses in step 4 of the Update protocol for v. At some point A stops
and outputs a vehicle identiﬁer v′. If v = v′ then B stops and outputs a
random bit b′. Otherwise B picks a random cell c′ and compare how many
times the vehicle v drives through c and c′. If v drives through c′ more than
through c then B stops and outputs zero. By the contrary, if v drives through
c more (or equally) often than through c′ then it outputs one.
Next we construct an adversary C against the strong unforgeability of the
signature scheme. Just as before, C will simulate the environment for A,
creating all public key pairs by herself, except for pkSE of a randomly chosen
vehicle v. For this key C will use the challenge key from the SEU game.
Whenever C needs a signature using skSE it will simply invoke the signing
oracle Ssk. At some point A stops and outputs a vehicle identiﬁer v′. If
v = v′ then C stops as well and outputs ⊥. If v = v′ then C will analyze
the transcript of the Update protocol for vehicle v submitted by A to the
oracle O, in particular to message 5. C decrypts this message (since it has
possession of skTSP) and all tickets in the ticket list T . As a result C obtains
a number of signatures (ignoring those tickets that decrypt to zero). From
these signatures C ignores those that it has submitted to the signing oracle
Ssk. From the remaining signatures it chooses one at random and stops. In
case that there is no such a signature, then it outputs ⊥.
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Theorem 5.2 (Privacy). If the checkpoint list matches the actual positioning
of surveillance cameras, then the scheme proposed in Section 3 does not leak
any extra location information about the vehicles.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that whenever the current position of a
vehicle is not a checkpoint cell, then the only information received by the
TSP is an encryption of zero.
6. The size of cells
An interesting question is what the ideal size of cells is. As we outlined in
Section 2 the ETP architecture needs to ﬁnd a balance between privacy on
the one hand and ﬁnancial integrity on the other. The privacy sensitive event
at stake is when a subscriber’s position becomes known to the system. There
are two occasions when this may happen:
1. when the subscriber’s car is photographed by a road-side camera; ne-
cessarily, the cell in which this camera is located is a check cell;
2. when the subscriber passes through a check cell and reports this passage
— assuming that the subscriber follows the protocol.
Ideally, these two events coincide: every passage through a check cell leads to
a photo registration. If not, there is a loss, either of privacy, or of eﬃciency
of checks. The unjustiﬁed loss of privacy conﬂicts with the proportionality
principle in Article 6 of the European directive on the protection of personal
data [1]. This means that cells should be relatively small, because with
larger cells the chance is higher that one visits a check cell without being
photographed. The question remains: how small should cells be? We shall
argue below that from an auditing perspective they should not be very small.
Now, when we look at the ﬁnancial integrity aspect we need to look at the
CBR system from an audit perspective. For the auditor the system is just
like any other system where sale slips are involved, and where the check
cell tickets play the role of sale slips he can validate. To provide revenue
assurance the auditor will typically take a percentage of sale slips (and thus
of check cell tickets) and validate if these are correctly handled, i.e. if the
check cells tickets are consistent with the photos taken. Compare [4].
If we assume that all cells generate roughly the same number of tickets, we
conclude that the percentage of tickets the auditor requires corresponds with
the percentage of check cells. Note that irrespective of the size of the cells,
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this percentage corresponds both to the probability of detecting fraud and
to the percentage of revenue reviewed by the auditor. To summarize, from
the ﬁnancial integrity objective it follows that a certain, ﬁxed percentage of
cells need to be check cells, independent of the size of the cells.
However, under this condition the total number of check cell tickets generated
is inﬂuenced by the size of the cells. Indeed, when the cells are small then
in absolute terms there will be many check cells and consequently there will
be many check cell tickets and thus many events where the subscriber looses
privacy sensitive data. So under the assumptions stipulated above it seems
that large cells are best for privacy. In addition, large cells seem best for the
system from a technical reliability perspective. Indeed, the errors in position
systems will have the highest inﬂuence in small cells. Here a worst case
scenario would be that these errors would make the OBU believe that the
subscriber is moving between cells where in fact he is standing still.
7. Extensions
We brieﬂy discuss two possible extensions of the CBR system, for parking
and for pay-as-you-drive insurance.
7.1. Parking
In a straightforward manner, the system can be modiﬁed to support parking
fee payment. This can be achieved by simply adding a status bit PKG to
the Declare protocol from Section 3, representing whether the vehicle is in
“driving” or “parking” state, see Figure 5.
The transition from one status to another can be done manually by having the
user pushing a button on the OBU; or it can also be done automatically, e.g.,
the OBU automatically changes to “parking” state when the user removes
the key from the vehicle’s ignition. When the vehicle starts moving again,
the system goes back to “driving” status.
In parking mode, tickets have possibly a diﬀerent validity time δ′ than in
driving more. This δ′ corresponds to the minimum payable parking time,
typically ﬁve minutes. After this time period, the parking ticket will expire
and then the OBU needs to initiate another Declare protocol instance to get
a new ticket. As before, if the parking cell is in the checkpoint list then the
corresponding ticket will be submitted to the TSP, allowing for inspection.
The parking fee is aggregated by the SE in the balance register or in a
diﬀerent register used exclusively for parking.
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(T , pkTSP)
OBU
(skSE, pkTSP, time, balance, ckpt)
SE
1. cpre, ccur, ts, p,PKG
ts > time
p > 0
time := ts
balance+= p
if ccur ∈ ckpt
ticket := { [cpre, ccur, ts, p,PKG]SE }pkTSP
else
ticket := { 0 }pkTSP
2. ticket
Figure 5: Declare Protocol with Parking.
Parking requires additional fraud detection, via cameras that occasionally
drive through a parking area that is marked as check cell, in order to take
photos. Such mobile checks are already happening in some existing parking
schemes. Possibly, additional check cells have to be added.
7.2. Pay-as-you-drive insurance
With road pricing the ﬂat road tax is replaced by a fairer system based on
actual, personal usage. In the car insurance business the same movement is
visible, where a ﬂat insurance fee is being replaced by a fee that depends on
the distance/time/location, or also on behavioral aspects like driving style.
This approach also requires that cars be equipped with boxes, monitoring
certain characteristics. In such “pay-as-you-drive” schemes privacy is a seri-
ous concern, and privacy-friendly approaches are appearing [14].
The CBR approach described in this paper can support pay-as-you-drive
insurance, but only to a limited extent. Of course, the OBU can register
various driving characteristics and pass them on directly to an insurance
company, but the interesting question is if the secure element SE in the
OBU can play a role in a privacy-friendly scheme. A separate insurance
pricing function can be added that translates cells plus time-of-day into an
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insurance cost. The SE can keep track of the resulting cumulative amount,
and produce tickets for each cell update. For fraud detection the insurance
company will need a contract with the toll service provider TSP in order to
use the same photo registrations in check cells.
8. Practical considerations and extensions
This section elaborates on some practical issues concerning getting public
trust in the SE, regarding memory, communication and computational com-
plexity of the protocol and it discusses possible optimizations.
With respect to getting public trust in the SE we suggest that it is certi-
ﬁed against an appropriate common criteria proﬁle and that its source code
(e.g. JavaCard applet) is disclosed. In addition, we suggest that after a cer-
tain period of time the checkpoint lists are also disclosed and that subscribers
can get access to cryptographic keys through the TSP allowing them to in-
spect the actual tickets sent in the update protocol. To further convince
subscribers that they are not sent checkpoints speciﬁcally tailored for them
one could send the checkpoints in through broadcast (e.g., through the Ra-
dio Data System (RDS) which is commonly used for dissemination of road
traﬃc information). Using RDS would also allow for regular checkpoint up-
dates without the need for the subscriber to be connected to a two-way
communication network such as GSM, GPRS or UMTS that also allow for
pinpointing the subscriber’s location. Actually, it might also be cheaper to
use RDS broadcasts than point-to-point communication.
To avoid usage of a static cryptographic key shared by all SEs in this context,
we suggest that a common temporary session key is negotiated with all (non-
revoked) SEs as part of the update protocol.
If we consider cells of 100 by 100 meters, then in a European context 32 bit
cell numbers will be suﬃcient. The protocol described in Section 3 generates
a ticket list of approximately 1 MB per 1000 km. Given that the average car
usage in Europe is in the order of 15000 km per year, this accounts for 15
MB of data per car per year, which is manageable but it can be improved.
It is possible to reduce the computational and bit complexity of the protocol
by a small modiﬁcation in the Declare Segment protocolD. This modiﬁcation
consists of accumulating a number of tickets at the SE and issuing only
one ticket every N cells. This ticket contains the same information as the
earlier N tickets, but it requires only one signature and one encryption. This
modiﬁcation does not aﬀect the security of the scheme as long as the resulting
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ticket is of constant size, i.e, padding should be used for those tickets that
are just zero. For N = 10 this optimization reduces the size of the transcript
ﬁle to just 200 KB per 1000 km which accounts to roughly 3Mb of data per
year for an average user. If we consider monthly reports, the transcript ﬁle
that needs to be sent will be on average of size 300 KB.
If this modest communication complexity is considered unacceptable, it can
further be reduced by only auditing a small random set of users. In Step (3)
in the Update protocol U the vehicle can ﬁrst commit to a certain balance
and then the TSP decides probabilistically whether it will request the ticket
list T or not. This comes of course as a trade-oﬀ for security but it can be a
viable option when the sanctions for fraud are severe enough.
Both optimizations reduce the amount of data that needs to be transmitted
and the computational complexity of the protocol. This is also important for
the TSP. In order to search for the ticket for a particular spot check, the TSP
needs to perform a number of decryptions. The timestamp in the tickets can
be used to search through the ticket list in (probabilistic) logarithmic time.
We remark that the scheme can obviously support more than one balance
register corresponding with cell cost categories instead of actual monetary
values. In this way the OBU does not need to be updated with actual cost
information; the transformation from cell cost categories to actual cost can
be done by the TSP. We also remark that the scheme trivially supports
toll roads by just letting toll road segments correspond to (expensive) cells.
Furthermore, the scheme might employ several checkpoint lists, which allows
more ﬂexible update periods and preventing overload of the communication
network. Of course, roadside cameras need to be aware of which car belongs
to which checkpoint list in order to prevent unnecessary monitoring. This can
be achieved by partitioning the licence plates among checklists, e.g., vehicles
with licence plate ending on x (or some cryptographic variation) are assigned
checkpoint list x.
9. Conclusions
We have proposed a novel protocol for Electronic Traﬃc Pricing. This pro-
tocol has fairly relaxed accuracy requirements for positioning hardware, mak-
ing it easy to implement in practice, in an open manner. The protocol is resi-
lient to colluding adversaries where the positioning of the checkpoints remain
secret, even after the reporting of road usage to the TSP. In contrast to other
systems from the literature, this reporting procedure does not require user
23
interaction which would drastically improve its acceptability. Additionally,
the current approach only involves interaction with the user when fraud is
detected, and not during honest usage.
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